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As digital platforms continually evolve, rapid changes to platform affordances quickly render digital tools and data collection methods obsolete. Researchers of digital culture therefore must proactively adapt to the ephemerality of data. This paper examines these challenges within the context of Twitter (X) following its 2022 acquisition by Elon Musk, and the subsequent limiting of access to the API for data collection. Using a combination of manual data-collection practices and Zeeschuimer [Peeters 2025], a browser extension that collects social media data while browsing, researchers developed a novel data collection method, and model methodological adaptability within shifting digital terrains.

Focusing on the two basic aspects of message strategies—“what to communicate” and “how to communicate”—the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of CSA message strategies. For the “what” strategies, a company can communicate about the social issue it is addressing, its stance on the issue, and what advocacy efforts it is making, as well as highlighting its motives and its history of commitment. For the “how” strategies, we review strategies for tone, value-oriented vs. action-oriented strategies, strategies of emotional appeals, and visual strategies. We identify valuable insights attained so far but point to areas where more research is needed. The chapter ends with a mini-case study comparing the message strategies of Lyft and Levi’s CSA supporting abortion rights in response to the Supreme Court’s 2022 Dobbs decision overturning Roe v. Wade.

This study analyzes 308 news articles published by 19 newspapers across 19 countries to examine the actors behind deepfakes, the associated threats, and the proposed solutions. Using the Russia–Ukraine war as a case study, the authors examined how newspapers frame deepfake-related actors, threats, and solutions during the conflict. Qualitative thematic analysis was used to analyze the data, and framing theory to interpret the findings. Findings reveal that the actors responsible for creating, distributing, and supporting deepfakes include state and political entities, technology companies and developers, criminal networks, covert channels, and propaganda agents. The threats posed by deepfakes span political, ethical, legal, social, security, and economic domains. Proposed solutions to counter deepfakes fall into several categories: technical, policy-based, regulatory, institutional, and educational. This research contributes to the growing body of literature on modern warfare, AI-generated disinformation, deepfakes, and the rapidly changing digital information ecosystem in the post-truth era.